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ABSTRACT
Two experiments used a dynamic control task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984) to examine
the flexibility of experientially acquired knowledge. The results suggest that
experientially acquired knowledge of this task is represented by a lookup table, not a set
of tuned strategies. With practice, transfer to a new task was achieved through an
extrapolation procedure. Experiment 2 demonstrated far superior task and transfer
performance in participants trained with a combination of experiential practice and
model-based knowledge. Transfer to new states was only possible when participants
were provided with model-based knowledge through direct instruction. Also, providing
model-based knowledge during practice resulted in a more flexible representation
compared to providing it before or after practice. Pedagogical implications are
discussed.

v

INTRODUCTION
A major goal of education is not only to teach content knowledge, but to teach
content in a way which allows learners to transfer that knowledge to a variety of
situations (Perkins & Salomon, 1992). For example, medical students who learn about
a disease in one case study are expected to recognize similar symptoms in a wide
range of patients. Similarly, pilots who learn to fly in small, single-engine planes are
eventually able to transfer their knowledge of aviation to larger, more complex planes in
a variety of flight conditions.
Research suggests human learning is achieved through two separate, but
complimentary processes; experience- and model-based processing (Anderson, 1982;
Berry & Dienes, 1993; Mathews et al.,1989; Reber, 1993, for a single process theory,
see Shanks & St. John, 1994). In these two-process models, model-based processing
involves the intentional use of a concrete representation, or a mental model of the task
such as a set of instructions or a recipe to guide performance (Johnson-Laird, 1982).
Experience-based knowledge, on the other hand, is acquired without intention, through
direct interaction with the environment. An example of experience-based learning is a
young child acquiring language. Children learn to communicate grammatically without
direct instruction through their interaction with others who speak the language (Dienes,
Broadbent, & Berry, 1991).
While many researchers agree that knowledge is acquired through these two
processes, the specific details of each process are debated. One particular area of
debate is the flexibility of experientially acquired knowledge. This is particularly
important as it pertains to training in some professional fields, such as medicine or
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aviation, where practitioners are expected to apply knowledge learned through
experience to mission critical decisions to new situations.

Some theories propose that

experientially acquired knowledge becomes rigidly tied to the task context in such a way
that transfer is unlikely (Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1998). Others suggest that in some
sense, general rules or strategies are learned which may transfer to new task
constraints (Lane, Mathews, Sallas, Prattini & Sun, 2007). These theories are
discussed below.
An example of a task that can be learned through experiential practice will help
elucidate this debate. The dynamic control task, developed by Berry and Broadbent
(1984), has been used by a number of researchers (e.g. Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Lane,
et al., in press; Marescaux, Luc, & Karnas, 1989; McGeorge & Burton, 1989; and
Stanley, et al., 1989). In this paradigm, participants control the output of a system by
varying the input, where the system is governed by some formula unknown to the
subject. In one version of the task, participants are told they will play the role of a sugar
factory manager, where the input is the number of workers and the output is production
in tons of sugar (Berry & Broadbent, 1984). Their “job” is to maintain sugar production
at some prescribed level. The system’s output is governed by a formula such as:
P = 20W-Ptr-1 + N, where sugar production is P, the number of workers entered is W,
the system’s output, or sugar production, on the previous trial is Ptr-1, and N is a noise
function which randomly adds 1000, -1000, or 0 with equal probability to the output.
Inputs range in hundreds from 100 to 1200 and outputs range in thousands from 1000
to 12000. For any given previous output, there is an input that will allow the system to
reach within 1000 tons of the goal state. For example, if the goal state were 6000 tons
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of sugar, the correct input when the previous output is 12000 tons of sugar is 900
workers (e.g. P = (20*900)-12000 + N)). Production values which fall above or below
the range of outputs are set to 12000 or 1000 respectively.
Lane, et al. (2007) argued that while this task may seem rather simple, it
functions in a way that makes it analogous to learning in the real world. First, the task is
dynamic, meaning that the state of the system changes with each input. Additionally,
the system is noisy such the same input can lead to multiple outputs. Third,
performance on the task improves with high levels of practice, but participants’ ability to
verbalize their performance lags behind actual task performance (Stanley, et al., 1989).
One example that shows how this task parallels real world learning is that of an
educator teaching students. Teaching is a dynamic task, in that a given strategy may
work well with students at one point in the school year, and not in another. Thus,
teachers must base their behavior on the current state of their students. Also, teachers
receive noisy feedback. A strategy that worked well with some students may fail with
others. Finally, becoming a highly effective teacher can take years to accomplish, and
even then, it can be difficult for expert teachers to describe their behavior.
While researchers agree that knowledge can be acquired through experiential
practice with a dynamic control task, there is debate over whether knowledge gained
through experience is stored as an inflexible set of specific instances or flexible, general
rules. In the case of the dynamic control task, researchers disagree over whether
participants store a lookup table of specific output-input pairs (e.g. if the output is 12000
tons of sugar, input 900 workers), or learn general rules or strategies (e.g. input a
number between the previous output and the goal state).
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One specific instance model was proposed by Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997;
see also Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Marescaux, Luc, & Karnas, 1989). In this model,
Dienes and Fahey argue that participants develop a lookup table of correct output-input
pairs as they interact with the task. Anytime the goal state is reached (plus or minus
1000 tons), participants are said to store the correct action for that particular output.
Future responses to “old-correct” outputs are made by recalling the correct response
based on a match between the current output and a stored output. Outputs which were
experienced before but a correct response was not made can be called old-incorrect.
Thus we can distinguish three types of trials: old-correct, old-incorrect, and new
situations (never experienced before). In this model, responses to situations without a
stored correct answer are determined via the application of explicit strategy (e.g. if
sugar production is below target, increase workers). In a similar model, these
responses are determined at random (see Cleeremans’ model, described in Marescaux,
Luc & Karnas, 1989). Dienes and Fahey provided evidence for their model by
demonstrating that at test (following 80 training trials), participants respond above
chance only to old-correct output states indicating very little transfer to other (oldincorrect or new) states. Furthermore, participants were more consistent in how they
responded to old-correct states than to other states. This pattern of results is consistent
with the storage of specific output-input pairs. If participants had developed a set of
general rules for responding, one would expect similar performance across all outputs.
Instead, a lookup table model would predict correct performance only for those outputs
for which a correct output-input pair had been stored (old-correct).
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Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997) argue that this knowledge is acquired implicitly,
or without intention. While participants responded above baseline to old-correct states,
this superior performance was independent of being able to recognize situations as old.
In addition, Dienes and Fahey cite previous research with the dynamic control task
which demonstrated that instructing participants to look for rules resulted in poor
performance (Berry & Broadbent, 1998). Berry and Broadbent argued that because the
task is implicit, attempting to learn the task in an explicit manner was detrimental to
performance. In summary, Dienes and Fahey argue that participants learn the dynamic
control task by developing an implicit lookup table consisting of specific correct outputinput pairs (see Table 1). These output-input pairs are inflexible meaning that
knowledge of specific pairs does not transfer to old-incorrect or new output states.
Furthermore, if such knowledge does not generalize even across situations within the
task (i.e. old-incorrect states), it could not be expected to transfer when task constraints
are changed (i.e. a different goal for sugar production).
Unlike Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997), Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003b) argue
that general strategies rather than specific output-input pairs are learned in the dynamic
system task. Their theory is based on the ACT-R procedural system (Anderson &
Lebiere, 1998). In this model, participants do not store specific instances, but instead
performance is based on a set of strategies which are tuned according to previous
performance. Fum and Stocco posit that participants possess a set of strategies before
experience with the task (e.g. choose random input, repeat-choice) and these strategies
are unconsciously chosen according to their expected utility. At first, strategies are
randomly selected, but when a strategy results in loosely correct performance (target
5

plus or minus 1000 tons) its expected utility increases. Strategies that work are likely to
be used in the future while unsuccessful strategies are less likely to be used.
Table 1. Simple lookup table of output-input pairs.
Output

Input

1000

400

2000

400

3000

500

4000

500

5000

600

6000

600

7000

600

8000

700

9000

700

10000

800

11000

800

12000

900
This tuning procedure might be likened to someone choosing a route to commute

to work. If there are five routes to choose from, the probability that any route will be
chosen on Day 1 is 0.2. However, if there is construction on the chosen route, its
expected utility will decrease, and the commuter will be less likely to choose that route
in the future. Conversely, if there is no traffic on the route, its expected utility will
increase and the commuter will be more likely to choose that route in the future. Fum
and Stocco’s (2003a, 2003b) model operates using the following five strategies:
•

“Choose Random”: Choose a random input

•

“Repeat-Choice”: Choose the same input entered on the previous trial
6

•

“Stay-On-Hit”: If the previous input was successful, repeat it. (More selective
version of “Repeat-Choice”)

•

“Pivot-Around-Target”: Input a value that is the same value of the target, plus or
minus one

•

“Jump On Middle”: Choose an input that lies midway between the previous
output and the upper or lower limit

Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003b) present data showing unsymmetrical transfer
between goal outputs as evidence for their model. Like Dienes and Fahey, Fum and
Stocco exposed participants to 2 blocks of 40 trials in the sugar factory task with one
significant difference. In the Dienes and Fahey (1995) task, goal performance was
always 6000 tons of sugar. Fum and Stocco used two goals (3000 and 9000) and
manipulated whether the goal stayed the same or changed across blocks resulting in
the following four groups: 3000-3000, 9000-9000, 3000-9000, and 9000-3000. The
potential success of a strategy is dependent on the goal state, such that some
strategies work better for specific goals, while others are superior regardless of the goal.
For example, when the goal state is set to 3000 tons, the Choose Random strategy
would result in an output within 1000 tons of the target on 18% of attempts. If the target
was 9000 tons, the same strategy would result in near target output on only 12% of
attempts. This difference is because 3000 is closer to the lower limit of 1000 than 9000
is to the upper limit of 12000. Outputs which fall below 1000 are set to the lower limit
(1000 tons), and on one third of these trials, the noise function adds 1000 tons to the
output, resulting in a loosely correct output. The goal of 9000 tons is not close enough
to the upper limit to benefit in this manner. In terms of their model, this means that
strategies which depend on the limit of the output scale work well when the goal is
3000, but not when the goal is 9000. Conversely, strategies which work when the goal
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is 9000, work regardless of the goal. For example, the Stay-On-Hit strategy works
equally well for either goal. Thus, in this model, when the goal is 3000, participants tune
their set of strategies such that the strategies that are likely reach the goal of 3000 are
selected. These strategies do not work as well when the goal is changed to 9000 and
performance is expected to be poor until the strategies are re-tuned. Strategies which
work when the goal is 9000 work at least as well at the goal of 3000. Thus,
performance should increase when the goal changes from 9000 to 3000 as the
strategies continue to be tuned with each successful trial.
Fum and Stocco’s (2003a, 2003b) results revealed better performance in the
3000-3000 condition relative to the 9000-9000 condition, confirming their hypothesis
that there are strategies which have a higher success probability for the goal of 3000
than for the goal of 9000. Instance based models (e.g. Dienes & Fahey, 1995) would
predict no difference between performance at any goal. Secondly, when the goal
changed from 3000 to 9000 performance was similar across blocks, but when the goal
changed from 9000 to 3000, performance improved significantly. Fum and Stocco
argue that an instance-based account is not able to explain this non-symmetric transfer
between goals. If performance was based on stored instances, it should not improve
when the goal changes as a lookup table is calibrated for a specific goal and would be
of no use for a new goal. Thus, they argue that performance in the dynamic control task
is based on the expected utility of strategies, not stored instances. In addition to
arguing that instances are not stored, the strategies in this model are context
independent. The model does not choose a strategy based on the previous output
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(unless the previous output was successful, as in the Stay-On-Hit strategy). Only the
strategy’s success in the past is valued.
There is however one concern with Fum and Stocco’s (2003a, 20003b)
interpretation against an instance-based model. Dienes and Fahey (1995) reported a
second experiment in which they varied the “salience” of the task. In the salient
condition, the correct input was always 600, while in the non-salient condition the
correct input was contingent on the previous output. Dienes and Fahey argued that
participants in the salient condition learned partially by a lookup table and partially by
learning a rule that could be applied across situations. This argument was based on
data showing that while participants still performed better on old-correct states
(instance-based), they were also above baseline on new states (rule-based).
It is possible that when the goal changed from 9000 to 3000, participants moved
from an instance-only representation to a representation that included both a rule
(always enter 200) and an instance-based representation. When the goal changed from
3000 to 9000, the representation would need to switch from a rule and instance-based
representation to an instance-only based representation with a new set of output-input
pairs. In this case, a subject would have developed a representation calibrated for the
goal of 3000 and learned a rule that worked because the goal was near the lower limit.
When the goal changed to 9000 participants needed to recalibrate their representation
for the new goal, and discover that the rule no longer works. Conversely, when the goal
changed from 9000 to 3000 participants’ lookup table was no longer calibrated for the
new goal, but they may have quickly learned a rule which lead to good performance.
Non-symmetric transfer does not necessarily rule out an instance-based model. Fum
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and Stocco’s data could be explained by a switch from an instance-based
representation to a representation comprised of both instances and a rule.
It is unclear what would cause this switch in representation. Nososfsy, Clark,
and Shin (1989) found in a perceptual classification task that a rule-based model fit
participants’ data when they were instructed to use rules. When no rules were
provided, an instance-based model best fit the data. Thus, instructing participants to
use a rule can influence the type of representation participants develop. While there
was no instruction to use a rule in above studies, the salience of the rule may have
driven the switch between the type of representation used.
Lane, et al. (2007) added a third perspective on the representation of
experientially acquired knowledge. To review, Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997) argue
that participants develop a lookup table consisting of specific output-input pairs, while in
Fum and Stocco’s (2003a, 2003b) model, individual instances are not stored, but a set
of context-independent strategies is tuned over time such that the most successful
strategies are most likely to be selected in the future. Lane, et al. suggested that
participants develop an implicit lookup table as proposed by Dienes and Fahey, but
argue that more general, contextually relevant rules (e.g. if the output is high, use an
input of 800), rather than specific instances are stored in the lookup table. One problem
with the proposal that knowledge is stored in a specific lookup table is dealing with the
large volume of instances which must be stored. If participants store all experienced
output-input pairs that lead to “loosely correct” outputs, at some point interference would
make it difficult to store new instances or recall old ones. Lane et al.’s model is in line
with Mathews’ (1991) Forgetting Algorithm in which the specific features of individual
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instances are lost over time and replaced with features which are common across
instances.
Lane, et al. (2007) provided several pieces of data to support this claim. First,
participants who learned the task through experiential practice were able to transfer
their knowledge to a new goal without a drop in performance. If participants relied only
on specific output-input pairs, transfer performance should have been poor as a specific
lookup table is calibrated for a particular output. Like Dienes and Fahey (1995), Lane,
et al. provide evidence that this knowledge is implicit by showing that performance on a
fill-in-the-blank style “table test”, which required participants to write the correct input for
each previous output to attain the goal state, was worse than actual performance on the
actual task completed just minutes before. If participants had access to the knowledge
they used to perform the task, performance should have been similar across both
measures.
Lane, et al. (2007) also argued against an instance-free representation like that
of Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003b). While the Fum and Stocco’s model can account for
transfer in Lane, et al.’s experiential practice condition, it cannot account for data
demonstrating that providing hints to participants improved performance. In Experiment
1, Lane, et al. provided participants in a “hint” condition three correct output-input pairs.
Performance on the dynamic control task was superior in participants who were
provided the hints relative to participants who learned though experiential practice
alone, even on output states for which no hint was provided. This suggests that
instances are important to learning the dynamic control task.
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Also, in Experiment 2, Lane, et al. (2007) provided participants in a “table”
condition with a full, correct lookup table. Thus, before practice with the task, these
participants knew how to reach the goal state from all previous states. Performance in
this group was superior to the experiential practice condition. On a transfer test, where
the goal changed from 6000 to 9000, participants in the table condition performed as
well as those in the experiential practice condition. This suggests that through
extensive practice with the task, participants in the table condition also acquired some
experiential knowledge. In Fum and Stocco’s (2003a, 2003b) model, participants in the
table condition would have not have the opportunity to tune a set of strategies as
instead, they employed an explicit lookup table to perform the task.
Lane, et al. (2007) provided evidence that when participants receive extensive
practice, knowledge is stored as somewhat more general rules rather than specific
instances (e.g. if output is high, input 800). Performance on a transfer test in which the
goal state was changed was compared between participants who had extensive
experiential practice with the task and a control condition which had no practice, but
was provided with a complete and correct look-up table to memorize before the test. A
specific look-up table model would predict similar performance across the two
conditions as the table provided to the control condition is presumed to be the form
which experientially acquired knowledge takes. Their results showed significantly better
performance on the transfer test for the experiential practice condition. In fact, the
experiential practice condition exhibited similar performance on both the new goal test
and standard test, where the goal was the same as training. Lane, et al. argued this
superior performance over control was the result of the flexibility of more general rules
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acquired through experiential practice compared to the inflexibility of a specific look-up
table.
One significant difference in the methodology between Lane, et al. (2007) and
the other research cited above (Dienes & Fahey 1995, 1997; Fum & Stocco, 2003a,
2003b) is amount of practice with the task that participants received. In Lane, et al.,
participants in the experiential practice condition of Experiment 1 interacted with the
task for an average of 3410 trials, compared to 80 trials in research by Dienes and
Fahey and Fum and Stocco. Both Lane, et al. and Dienes and Fahey (1998) speculate
that learners with low levels of practice may represent experientially acquired
knowledge in the form of a specific look-up table, which is replaced with a set of general
rules with more experience. Furthermore, Fum and Stocco (2003b) suggested that
storing instances may be important to learning in a dynamic control task, but not in the
levels of training provided to participants in their experiments. While the idea that the
representation of knowledge may change across time seems to fit the data described
above, the hypothesis has not been explicitly tested within a single study, and
extrapolation across studies is problematic due to several significant procedural
differences beyond the number of training trials.
Another difference is that both Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997) and Fum and
Stocco (2003a, 2003b), used long blocks of trials which may have limited participants’
exploration of the problem space (Newell & Simon, 1972). In these studies, each block
consisted of 40 trials, with each new output dependent on the previous output and the
subject’s input. Thus, participants may have spent more time at one particular output
level, as several inputs (100, 200, 300, 1000, 1100, and 1200) result in an output at the
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lower or upper limit in most situations in which they are applied. Additionally, both
Dienes and Fahey and Fum and Stocco used a procedure which always set the output
to 6000 at the beginning of the block and displayed the previous input as 600. Some
participants may have assumed, correctly, that they should input 600 when the output is
6000. The resulting answer would be correct, and participants would have no incentive
to input any other value. Lane, et al. (2007) used blocks of ten trials and randomly
chose a starting position at the beginning of each block. Thus participants were
exposed to each output state multiple times in practice while those in the other studies
reported here did not experience all system states. It is possible that when very few
states are experienced, a look-up table is most effective representation. Conversely,
when many states are experienced, a more general representation may be more
effective.
Also, different cover stories have been used across studies. Dienes and Fahey
(1995, 1997) and Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003) used the Sugar Factory task
described above. Lane, et al. (2007) used a nuclear reactor cover story in which
participants entered fuel pellets and the system’s output was reactor temperature.
While it is unlikely that the cover story contributed to differences in knowledge
representation, a single cover story (nuclear reactor) will be used in the proposed
experiments.
Another significant difference between Lane, et al. (2007) and the research of
Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003b) and Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997) is that Lane, et al.
provided some participants with model-based knowledge about the task. Lane, et al.
suggested that participants may learn best from a combination of direct instruction and
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experiential practice compared to either type of instruction in isolation. Though
numerous studies demonstrate that the dynamic control task can be learned through
experiential practice alone (Berry & Broadbent, 1983; Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1997;
Fum & Stocco 2003a, 2003b; Stanley, 1989), participants in Lane, et al. who memorized
the full look-up table before practicing the task achieved much better performance than
those who learned the task through experiential practice only. However, when the goal
state was changed on a new goal test or response time was limited on a speeded test,
performance suffered in participants who received both model-based knowledge and
experiential practice, falling to levels similar to the experiential practice only condition
(but still significantly better than a no practice control condition). Lane, et al. argued that
participants who memorized the table before practice also acquired experiential
knowledge through practice with the system. Thus when the system parameters
changed, making it difficult to use their model-based knowledge, they reverted to their
less precise experiential knowledge. Lane, et al. claim that participants in the table
condition must have acquired a similar level of experiential knowledge as those
participants in the experiential practice condition. However, it is possible that
participants who memorized the table may not have developed as much experiential
knowledge as those in the practice-only condition. Because participants in the table
condition knew the correct input for each output, there was no need for them to explore
the problem space and develop additional knowledge. The relatively poor performance
on the new goal and speeded tests may have been the result of not exploring the
problem space. If participants followed the look-up table, they would reach the target
after the first trial of each block, and noise would move the output between 5000-7000.
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Thus, participants would need to recall the input for one of those three outputs on nine
of every ten trials. Additionally, 25% of the first trials of each block would begin on one
of those numbers (5000, 6000, or 7000), meaning that if participants exclusively
followed the table, they would recall the input (600) for those three outputs more than
nine times as often as the other inputs combined.
Secondly, data from Lane, et al. (2007) suggest that model-based knowledge
can be transferred without any experiential practice. Two control groups were run with
both groups taking the transfer test (9000 goal) with no prior experience with the task.
One of the groups memorized a table with the output-input pairs calibrated for the
standard test goal (6000 goal). While not a significant effect, participants who
memorized the table performed nominally better than those without the table (p = .07).
Both the experiential practice and table plus practice conditions outperformed both of
the control conditions on the new goal test, demonstrating that model-based knowledge
alone does not transfer to a new goal as well as model-based knowledge combined with
experiential practice. However, that model-based knowledge alone does seem to
transfer slightly better than no knowledge at all could be evidence that participants in
the table condition were not only relying on experientially acquired knowledge during the
transfer test. Thus, while Lane, et al. (2007) demonstrate that providing model-based
knowledge along with experiential practice improves task performance and transfer, it is
possible that the provision of model-based knowledge before practice reduces
participants’ exploration of the problem space resulting in superior performance for only
some output states. The implication of this is that providing model-based knowledge
before practice may reduce the amount of experientially acquired knowledge. By
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delaying the point at which model-based knowledge is provided it may be possible to
increase participants’ acquisition of experiential knowledge. This, in turn, may reduce
the decline in performance when the goal is changed or the response time is limited
associated with the provision of model-based knowledge found by Lane, et al.
The first goal of the current experiments is to study the flexibility of experientially
acquired knowledge as a function of length of practice. Experiment 1 will test the
speculation of both Dienes and Fahey (1995) and Lane, et al. (2007) that with little
practice, participants represent experientially acquired knowledge as a lookup table
which is rigidly tied to the task context and unlikely to transfer, and that with more
practice knowledge is represented as general rules which are still valid when the task
constraints change.
Of course, not all learning occurs experientially. Some knowledge is acquired via
direct instruction or a combination of direct instruction and experiential practice. From
Lane, et al. (2007), it is clear that participants who received model-based knowledge
outperformed those who only acquired experiential knowledge, but the model-based
knowledge group was not able to transfer their knowledge as well as the experiential
practice group. So while instructing learners with model-based knowledge may lead to
strong task performance, there is a cost in terms of transfer to a new goal associated
with direct instruction. Experiment 2 will examine the hypothesis that allowing
participants to practice the task before providing them with model-based knowledge will
allow participants to develop a flexible representation which can transfer when the task
constraints change and also acquire very accurate task-specific knowledge.

17

EXPERIMENT 1
Participants in experiment 1 were assigned to 1 of 2 conditions, which differed
only in the amount of training on the process control task. Those in the short training
condition completed 14 blocks, with each block consisting of six trials. This resulted in
slightly (84 vs. 80) more trials than participants in Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997) and
Fum and Stocco (2003a, 2003b) experienced. However, the previous output for the first
trial of each block was selected using a random without replacement selection
procedure, such that each output state was seen at least once across the 84 trials.
Unlike previous research using long blocks, this ensured that participants were exposed
to the entire problem space. Participants in the long training condition completed 280
blocks (1680 trials), or 20 times the amount of practice in the short training condition.
After a short or long training phase, participants took a series of tests. The first
test was similar to the training phase, except that the range of outputs were extended
from 1000-12000 to -3000-16000. Additionally, after selecting a response, participants
were required to place a wager on the outcome of their response as a measure of
confidence in their decision (Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007). Following the
extended range test, participants took a new goal test, as in Lane, et al. (2007) in which
the goal output was 8000 rather than 6000. Finally, also like Lane, et al., participants
completed a table test. Here, participants were asked a series of questions about the
correct input for each previous output (e.g. If the reactor’s temperature is 12000
degrees, how many fuel pellets should you enter to move the temperature to 6000
degrees).
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This procedure allowed for the testing of multiple hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is that with little training, participants represent knowledge acquired through
experiential practice as a specific lookup table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1997), not a set
of tuned strategies (Fum & Stocco, 2003a, 2003b). A look-up table model predicts poor
performance on previously unseen states while a strategy-based model would predict
similar performance across both previously seen and unseen (extended range) states.
In a lookup table model, if the learner has not experienced a state, they could not
possibly store a condition-action link for that state. Dienes and Fahey provided
evidence for this model by demonstrating that participants performed poorly at test for
states which they had not seen, or had not entered a loosely correct input, at practice.
By extending the range, it was assured that participants encountered some output
states for which they could not possibly have the correct output-input pair stored. If
performance is based on a lookup table, superior performance should be expected on
old-correct output states.
If participants tuned a set of strategies during training (Fum & Stocco 2003a,
2003b), performance should be consistent across all states on the Extended-Range
Test. Any strategy tuned to reach the goal of 6000 in practice, where the range is 100012000, will work equally as well when the range is extended. The goal of 6000 is not
near enough to the upper or lower limit in the standard or extended range to benefit
from the limit as the goal of 3000 did in Fum and Stocco. Thus, if participants use a set
of tuned strategies to perform the task, no difference in performance should be
expected across output states in the standard and extended range.
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One criticism of this analysis might be that subject could possibly have a lookup
table and use some extrapolation procedure to “fill in” missing cells in the table. In the
proposed experiment, reaction times will be measured. It is reasonable to assume that
recalling an output-input pair will take significantly less time than calculating the correct
input based on known output-input pairs. Thus if participants extrapolate missing
output-input pairs based on their current lookup table, the data should show similar
performance on old-correct compared to new and old-incorrect outputs, as participants
should be able to “work out” the correct answer. Also, participants should take longer to
respond to new and old-incorrect outputs, as the extrapolation procedure should come
at a time cost over simply recalling a stored output-input pair. It is not expected that the
results will suggest such extrapolation, as Dienes and Fahey (1995) found on their
specific situation test that participants responded correctly to new items less than 10%
of the time compared to 32% for old-correct items. If an extrapolation procedure was
being used, one would expect above chance performance on these new states. That
responses on new states were at chance is not indicative of an extrapolation strategy.
The second hypothesis is that with high levels of training, participants’
representation of experientially acquired knowledge changes from a specific lookup
table to a set of contextually relevant rules. Dienes and Fahey (1995) show that with
little training participants rarely answer correctly on items for which they had not
previously answered correctly. On the other hand, Lane, et al. (2007) demonstrated
that participants with extensive experiential practice do equally well on a standard and a
far transfer test where the goal was changed from 6000 to 9000. In the current
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experiment, both the extended range and the new goal tests required participants to
transfer knowledge.
If knowledge is represented as a look-up table, performance on outputs
previously answered correctly in the extended range test should be superior to unseen
(extended range) outputs. Conversely, a general rules model would predict no
difference across both types of items. If knowledge representation changes with
practice participants with little training should show poor performance on new and oldincorrect output states, suggesting the use of a lookup table, while those in the long
training condition should show similar performance across all output states, suggesting
the use of a set of general rules. Again, reaction times can be used to ensure that
participants are not extrapolating empty cells from a lookup table.
Similarly on the new goal test, if knowledge is stored as a lookup table,
participants should show poor performance across all output states because they would
not have the correct output-input pairs stored for the new goal. If knowledge were
stored as flexible general rules, this knowledge should transfer to a new goal.
The extended range test was also used to test the hypothesis that with practice,
participants become increasingly aware of their knowledge of the task. Many
researchers argue that experientially acquired knowledge is stored implicitly, or without
awareness. Berry and Broadbent (1984) reported that with low levels of practice,
participants showed better than chance performance, but could not verbalize how they
were performing the task. Additionally, Hayes and Broadbent (1988) found that a
concurrent memory task did not harm task performance. Most models of implicit
knowledge assume it is deployed automatically, and thus impervious to the demands of
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other tasks (Anderson, 1983). On the other hand, Stanley, et al. (1989) asked
participants to write instructions for novices at multiple points during training and found
that while performance based on these instructions lagged behind the participants’
actual task performance, participants were able to report some knowledge. The results
of Stanley, et al. suggest that knowledge acquired experientially may at first be implicit,
but that participants may become aware of at least some of this knowledge with greater
experience with the task. It is important to note that using verbal reports as evidence
that participants are unaware of their knowledge has been criticized (Holender, 1986;
Shanks & St. John, 1994; Tunney and Shanks, 2003). Shanks and Tunney argue that
participants do not report experientially acquired knowledge due to a response bias,
rather than a lack of access to this knowledge. They claim that participants set their
own criteria for responding, and that this criterion may be set too conservatively. Thus,
they argue participants do not report awareness of knowledge even though they have
some level of awareness.
Recently, Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey (2006) used a post-decision wagering
procedure to demonstrate a lack of awareness of experientially acquired knowledge.
Three tasks which are often used in the implicit learning literature were employed;
blindsight, the Iowa gambling task, and artificial grammar learning. In each of these
tasks, participants typically are able to perform the task at above chance levels, but
cannot report how they make their decisions (Reber, 1967). Persaud, et al. asked
participants to make either a large or small wager after each decision, but before
feedback was given. If participants are aware of the knowledge they use to make
decisions, they should attempt to maximize their earnings by placing large wagers after
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responses they know to be correct, and small wagers following responses they are
unsure of. While participants responded with greater than chance accuracy to the
primary task, participants did not systematically place wagers to maximize winnings,
suggesting a lack of awareness. Additionally, participants did not consistently place the
minimum wager, which would have suggested the placement of a high criterion such as
Shanks and Tunney have suggested. Persaud, et al. speculate that subjective
measures of awareness force an introspective process, asking participants how aware
they are of their awareness. Asking participants to make a wager may allow for a more
precise measure of awareness due to the fact that participants need only make a binary
choice (high or low wager) and can base their decision on any evidence they feel has
utility.
If with low levels of practice, knowledge is stored as an implicit lookup table,
participants should not demonstrate awareness through advantageous wagering.
However, as Stanley, et al. (1989) reported, participants who receive high levels of
training can verbalize at least some of their knowledge of the task, though verbal reports
lagged behind actual task performance. As experience with the task increases,
participants with more practice should be more successful at maximizing earnings,
thereby demonstrating awareness of the knowledge used to perform the task.
However, in line with Stanley, et al., participants in the long training condition may not
exhibit perfect wagering performance as awareness may lag behind task performance.
Finally, participants will be asked to articulate their knowledge on a table test.
Lane, et al. (2007) found that when asked to complete a table that asked them to write
the correct input for a given output, participants who only practiced the task performed
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worse on the table test than their task performance would predict. Again, Stanley, et al.
(1989) suggested that participants’ ability to articulate task knowledge lagged behind
task performance. A similar pattern should be expected in experiment 1 such that
participants with little practice should not be able to report any task knowledge, even for
output states for which they have the correct input stored (old-correct). Like in Lane, et
al., participants with more training should perform better than those with little training on
the table test, but not as well as their task performance would predict.
Method
Participants. Eighty undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at Louisiana State University were recruited to voluntarily participate in return
for extra credit. These participants were randomly assigned to either to either the short
(N = 40) or long (N = 40) training condition.
Task. The reactor control task, used in both experiments, is a computer-based
task in which participants imagine they are the manager of a nuclear reactor (see figure
1). Participants attempted to achieve and maintain a specified level of an output
variable, reactor temperature, by controlling the number of fuel pellets consumed by the
reactor. Participants were given the goal of maintaining temperature at 6000 degrees.
Task trials were grouped into blocks of six trials and each block began with a randomly
selected reactor temperature level. On each task trial, participants saw a display which
depicted two graphs; output temperature and number of fuel pellets input. On both
graphs, trial number was depicted on the X-axis, while output temperature or number of
fuel pellets entered was depicted on the Y-axis. Reactor temperature varied from 1000
degrees to 12000 degrees in 1000-degree increments. A horizontal line was positioned
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across the entire output graph at the 6000 degree level to remind participants of the
goal state. Participants selected a number of fuel pellets ranging from 100 to 1200 in
multiples of 100. Participants responded by entering the number of pellets to be fed into
the reactor. This was done by clicking on one of twelve input buttons on the left side of
the screen. The computer then determined the new output level based on a formula
and displayed the new output on the temperature graph. At the end of each block
(every 6 trials), the display was cleared and a new graph was displayed for the next
block of trials. The main dependent measure was the mean unsigned deviation from
target production, in degrees. Response times were also recorded.

Figure 1. Reactor control task.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups up to eight. Each group was
randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Participants completed a prescribed
number of practice trials followed by the extended range test, the new goal test, and the
table test, in that order.
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During the practice phase, participants were instructed to take on the role of
manager of a nuclear reactor, where their job was to achieve and maintain a target
temperature level (6000 degrees) by interacting with the simulator. They were told that
the only variable they would control was the number of fuel pellets entered into the
reactor, which would be done by clicking on the button with the corresponding number
of fuel pellets with their mouse. Participants in the short training condition completed 14
blocks (84 trials) while those in the long training condition completed 280 blocks (1680)
trials.
After completing the practice phase, participants completed the extended range
test. This test required participants to enter an input for a given output. The interface
for this test was the same as the practice trials, but this test was comprised of a series
of single-trial blocks. An output between -3000 and 16000 was randomly selected and
participants selected an input between 100 and 1200 fuel pellets. After selecting an
input, participants choose between placing a large or small wager on the outcome of
their response. No feedback was given in terms of the resulting output state nor the
status of the wager. After the wager was selected, the computer redrew the screen with
a new output level. This continued until participants responded to all outputs between
-3000 and 16000. This test used a single trial format to limit the amount of exposure to
the task for participants in the short training condition. Using a six-trial block like the
practice phase would have more than doubled their exposure to the task and provided
feedback during that exposure. The test ended after participants responded to all 20
output states.
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After completing the extended range test, participants took the new goal test.
This test consisted of 30 blocks and followed the procedure of the practice phase with
the only change being that participants will be instructed to maintain an output of 8000
instead of 6000 degrees. Like the practice phase, a horizontal line was drawn across
the output graph at the goal state of 8000 degrees.
Finally, participants completed a text-based table test which required them to
provide the correct number of fuel pellets for each output state (from 1000-12000 in
increments of 1000) to achieve a temperature of 6000 degrees (e.g. “If the temperature
is 9000 how many fuel pellets should you enter to move the reactor’s temperature to
6000”).
Results
The primary variable of interest was performance, or unsigned deviation from the
goal state, with a lower score indicating better performance. A log transformation,
log10(deviation+1), was performed on deviation scores due to the high variability of the
scores. A constant of 1 was added to all deviation scores so a deviation of 0 could be
transformed, as the log of 0 is undefined. While untransformed means are reported
(see Table 2), all analysis on performance scores were preformed on transformed data.
After practice, participants first took the extended range test. Deviation from the
goal state was measured, which allowed for analysis of performance on old states and
transfer to new, extended range states. Reaction time was also measured to determine
if participants were using different strategies to respond on old versus new states. In
addition, participants made a wager after selecting their response for each output. This
was done as a measure of confidence in their response.

27

Participants next took the new goal test and deviation and reaction time was
measured. This test measured participants’ ability to transfer their knowledge acquired
while practicing the task when the goal was 6000 to a new goal output state of 8000.
Again, reaction time was collected as a way to gain insight to the strategies participants
used to transfer their knowledge.
Finally, the table test as a way to assess participants’ ability to use their acquired
knowledge in a different context. Better than chance performance on this test would
indicate access to experientially acquired knowledge, rather than the knowledge being
completely implicit.
Table 2. Mean deviation scores for Experiment 1.
Last 5
Practice
Blocks
2889 (831)

Extended
range TestOld States
3667 (1513)

Extended
range TestNew States
6266 (1667)

Long
Training
Short
3079 (593)
5079 (1212) 6856 (1092)
Training
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.

new goal
Test

Table test

2766 (980)

2788 (1112)

3584 (623)

3677 (771)

Extended Range Test. Performance was analyzed using a 2x2 mixed factorial
ANOVA with training condition (short, long) as a between-subject factor and state type
as a within-subject factor (old, new) (see Figure 2). This analysis revealed a main effect
of state type with performance on old items being superior to performance on new
states (M = 4372.9, 6560.9; F (1, 78) = 43.1, p< .001 ηp2 = .44). A significant main
effect of condition was also found, with participants in the long training condition
producing lower deviation scores than those in the short training condition (M = 4966.2,
5967.7; F (1, 78) = 5.89, p < .05 ηp2 = .07). The main effects were qualified by an
interaction revealing that the superior performance of the long condition was only
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observed on old states (F (1, 78) = 4.2, p< .05 ηp2 = .051). Subsequent analysis
revealed that performance of both groups was better than chance on old states but did
not differ from chance on new states. Chance deviation from goal on old states was
5792 and 6473 on new states.
8000

Unsigned Deviation

7000
6000
5000
4000

Long Training

3000

Short Training

2000
1000
0
Old States

New States

Figure 2. Performance on extended range test in Experiment 1. Dependent measure is
the absolute deviation from target.
Due to the long practice phase, there were no old-incorrect states on the
extended range test for participants in the long training condition, meaning there was at
least one loosely correct response for each output state during practice. This was not
the case for those in the short training condition. Analysis revealed that performance on
old-correct states was superior to that on old-incorrect (M = 4261.4, 5929.9; t (39) =
2.54, p< .05). While performance on old-incorrect states was inferior to old-correct
states, performance on old-incorrect states still significantly better than chance, unlike
performance on new states.
Similar analyses were conducted on reaction time data from the Extended range
test (see Figure 3). A main effect of group was found, with participants in the long
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training condition responding more quickly than those in the short training condition (M =
4563.4, 6475.5; F (1, 78) = 16.3, p< .001 ηp2 = .172). A main effect of state type was
found as well, with participants responding more quickly on new states than old (M =
4933.8, 6105.1; F (1, 78) = 12.6, p< .01 ηp2 = .139). There was no significant interaction
(F < 1). Additionally, no difference was found in reaction times between old-correct and
old-incorrect states for participants in the short training condition.
8000
7000
6000

ms

5000
4000

Long Training

3000

Short Training

2000
1000
0
Old States

New States

Figure 3. Reaction time on extended range test in Experiment 1. Dependent measure is
the reaction time in ms.
Taken together, data from the extended range test suggest a lookup table model
at both levels of training as predicted by Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1997). Both a
general rule model (Lane et al., 2007) and a strategy tuning model (Fum & Stocco
2003a, 2003b) would predict similar performance across both old and new states, while
a lookup table model would predict better performance on old states. While chance
performance and fast responses on new states is consistent with Cleeremans’ model,
(described in Marescaux, Luc & Karnas, 1989) which predicts that situations for which
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there is no stored output-input pair are answered with a random input, a visual analysis
of the distribution of inputs for new states suggests participants were responding
incorrectly, but not randomly. Participants in the short training condition tended to input
low levels of fuel pellets across all new states. This pattern is difficult to interpret. If
participants were using some strategy based on real world knowledge (e.g. if the
temperature is very high, enter a low level of fuel pellets), one would expect low levels
of pellets inputted at high temperature levels and high levels of pellets at low
temperatures. Instead, low levels of pellets are input across all new states. Again, this
pattern is difficult to interpret but it is not random. While this is inconsistent with
Cleereman’s model, it is important to note that new states in that model were states
within the standard range (1000-12000) which were not encountered during a very short
practice phase.
Participants in the long training condition demonstrated a more easily
interoperated strategy. Here, participants tended to avoid entered very low (100, 200)
or very high (1100, 1200) levels of fuel pellets. While this strategy lead to poor
performance on the extended range states, it is a valid strategy for responding to old
states. Participants learned through practice that very high and low inputs always led to
extreme outputs (1000, 12000) and seemed to use this strategy at new states which
lead to poor performance. Because no feedback was given on the extended range test,
there was no opportunity for participants to see that this strategy did not work. This
pattern of results in both the short and long training conditions is consistent with Dienes
and Fahey’s (1995) model suggesting that responses to new states are generated using
a strategy.
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In addition to deviation and reaction time measures, a knowledge score was
derived from participants wagering behavior. The knowledge score was the proportion
of correct wagers; high wager when correct or low wager when incorrect. An analysis
revealed a significantly higher knowledge score for participants in the long training
condition (M = .664, .573; F (1, 78) = 4.56, p< .05 ηp2 = .055). Additional analysis
revealed the knowledge scores of both groups to be significantly above chance (.5). A
knowledge score above chance in both conditions would suggest that participants have
some access to the knowledge used to perform the task, contrary to notion that
experientially acquired knowledge is implicit, or inaccessible.
New Goal Test. The effect of training condition on transfer to a new goal was
analyzed using a 2 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA with training condition (short, long) as a
between-participants factor and goal as a within-participants factor (6000, 8000) (see
Figure 3)1. The analysis revealed a main effect of condition, with participants in the long
training condition performing better than those in the short training condition (M = 2766,
3584; F (1, 78) = 4.0, p< .05 ηp2 = .048). A main effect of goal was also found with
superior performance seen at the goal of 6000 (M = 2834, 3175; F (1, 78) = 8.76, p<
.005 ηp2 = .101). A trend towards an interaction was also found (F (1, 78) = 3.83, p=
.054 ηp2 = .047). A planned comparison paired-sample t-test revealed a significant
decline in performance in the short training condition (t (39) = -3.35, p< .01). No
significant difference was found between goals in the long training condition (t < 1).
Both groups performed better than chance on the new goal test.
1

Performance at the 6000 goal was derived from the participants’ mean deviation from 6000 over the last
five blocks during the practice session. Performance on the extended range test was not used because it
does not allow for multiple step procedures. Some participants may have develop a strategy in which
they use two or more steps to reach the target (e.g. enter 1200 to move to the top of the range, and then
enter 900) which would not have been captured on their performance on the Extended range test.
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A similar analysis on reaction time data showed a significant main effect of
condition (see Figure 5), with participants in the long training condition responding more
quickly than those in the short training condition (M = 1091, 2918; F (1, 78) = 25.5, p<
.001 ηp2 = .247). A main effect of goal was also found, showing faster reaction times at
the goal of 6000 (M = 1535.9, 2004.3; F (1, 78) = 25.8, p< .001 ηp2 = .249). There was
no significant interaction (F < 1).
4000

Unsigned Deviation

3500
3000
2500
2000

long

1500

short

1000
500
0
Last 5 Practice Blocks

New Goal

Figure 4. Performance on the last 5 blocks of practice and the new goal test in
Experiment 1. Dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target.
Like the extended range test, these data are consistent with a lookup table model
(Dienes & Fahey 1995, 1997). A general rules model (Lane et al., 2007) and a strategy
tuning model (Fum & Stocco 2003a, 2003b) would predict similar performance across
both goals. While participants in the long training condition did not exhibit a significant
decline in performance on the new goal test, they, along with the short training
condition, did show significantly slower reaction times. This is consistent with the use of
an extrapolation procedure to derive new actions based on old condition-action (output-
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input) pairs. A general rule or set of tuned strategies would not predict slower reaction
times.
3500
3000

ms

2500
2000
Long Training
1500

Short Training

1000
500
0
Last 5 Practice Blocks

New Goal Test

Figure 5. Reaction time on last 5 blocks of practice and new goal test in Experiment 1.
Dependent measure is the reaction time in ms.
Table Test. A one-way ANOVA with group as the between subjects factor
revealed a significant difference in table test performance between the long and short
training conditions (M = 2788, 3677; F (1, 78) = 10.9, p< .01 ηp2 = .123). Performance
of both groups is better than chance (see Figure 6). An analysis of the correlation
between performance on the last 5 blocks of practice and performance on the table test
showed a significant positive correlation for the long training condition (r = .373, p < .05)
and no significant correlation in the short training condition (r = .144, ns). Like the data
from the wagering task, these data run contrary to the idea that participants do not have
access to any knowledge of the task. Better than chance performance demonstrates
that participants in both conditions can use knowledge learned in one setting (a dynamic
task with graphic displays) to a static task with questions asked in text form. Along the
same line, superior performance in the long training condition demonstrates greater
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access to task knowledge as practice increases. Also, the significant correlation in the
long but not short training condition suggests as task knowledge increases, so does
access to that knowledge. This is in line with Stanley, et al. (1989) who argued that
access to task knowledge increases with practice but lags behind task performance.
4000

Unsigned Deviation
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1000
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Figure 6. Performance on the table test in Experiment 1. Dependent measure is the
absolute deviation from target.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 replicated Lane et al. (2007) by demonstrating
transfer to a new goal with experiential practice. However, transfer to new states was
not observed. To return to the original hypotheses, the results of Experiment 1 suggest
that knowledge of the process control task is represented as a lookup table, rather than
a set of tuned strategies (Fum & Stocco, 2003a, 2003b). The data fit well with a lookup
table comprised of specific output-input pairs (Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1997).
Participants were able to transfer to a new goal, but with a significant cost in response
time which may indicate the use of an extrapolation procedure. This transfer could also
be explained by a more general, contextualized table comprised of general rules (Lane
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et al.) where an effective rule for a goal of 6000 (if temperature is high, input 800 fuel
pellets) may be slightly less effective when the goal changes to 8000. Unlike transfer to
a new goal, participants were not able to transfer to new states. While on the surface,
this pattern seems to be consistent with Cleermans’ argument (described in Marescaux,
Luc & Karnas, 1989) that unseen states are answered randomly, further inspection
revealed strategic, but incorrect responses.
In addition to addressing the issue of flexibility, awareness of experientially
acquired knowledge was also assessed. The results of the wagering task and the Table
test demonstrate that even with very little practice, participants have some awareness of
the knowledge used to operate the process control task and that awareness increases
with practice. This is contrary to the idea of an implicit lookup table proposed by Dienes
and Fahey (1995, 1997)
While this representation does not seem to change as amount of practice is
increased, it is important to note that participants in the long practice condition in
Experiment 1 completed only one-third of the training trials as those in Lane et al.
Future research should investigate if extremely high levels of practice result in a shift in
knowledge representation from a lookup table to a general rule.
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EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the flexibility of knowledge acquired
through experiential practice with the process control task. Results revealed that
regardless of practice level, task knowledge was represented as a specific lookup table.
While in the laboratory, it is appropriate to study experiential practice in isolation, but
real world learning often combines experiential practice and model-based knowledge.
Experiment 2 sought to examine the flexibility of knowledge as a function of instruction
type.
Instruction, at a simple level, can be divided into two types. In direct instruction,
complete knowledge is provided directly by the teacher to the learner (Kirschner,
Sweller, & Clark, 2006). In experiential practice, the learner is given very little guidance
and is said to construct the knowledge themselves (Bruner, 1961; Papert, 1980, Steffee
& Gale, 1995). While the experiential practice method is very popular with educators,
its efficacy has been questioned (Klahr & Nigam 2004; Mayer, 2004). Proponents of
experiential practice argue that excessive guidance during acquisition may impair the
learner’s performance on tests of retention and transfer (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark,
2006) However, in a review of the literature, Mayer (2006) consistently found superior
task performance learners taught using direct instruction and no advantage of
experiential practice on tests of retention or transfer performance.
While the Mayer’s (2004) work would make it seem that direct instruction is the
superior pedagogical methodology, the results of Lane et al. (2007) cast some doubt
onto this argument. Lane, et al. found that providing participants with a complete lookup
table before practice with the task produced superior performance on the process
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control task when compared to participants who practiced the task without a table.
There were, however, costs associated with this provided lookup table. Specifically, a
significant decline in performance was observed when time to respond was limited
(speeded test) or when the goal state was changed (new goal test). Although
performance declined when the task parameters of the task changed, transfer
performance in this table group was at similar levels to those subjects in the practiceonly condition. Lane, et al., suggested that some experiential knowledge, gained
through practice with the task, was acquired in addition to the lookup table. However,
as detailed in the introduction, it is unclear whether participants in Lane, et al. who
memorized the table before experiential practice acquired as much experiential
knowledge as participants who practiced the task without a table. When using very
precise model-based knowledge, learners may get limited exposure to the task. By only
entering the correct input for a given output, learners do not explore the problem space,
thus reducing the amount of experientially acquired knowledge. While direct instruction
improved task performance, providing that instruction before experiential practice may
not be the optimal point for its introduction. Thus it is possible that proponents of both
direct instruction and experiential practice are partially correct, and that the best
pedagogical approach is a combination of the two.
To examine this issue, Experiment 2 used the same Nuclear Reactor task as
Experiment 1. Participants engaged in a practice phase followed by a standard test, in
which the goal was 6000 degrees, a speeded test where time to respond was limited to
1100 ms, an extended range test with wagering, a new goal test, and table test.
Participants were assigned to 1 of 7 conditions; four training conditions and three no-
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training control conditions. The amount of training was consistent across the training
conditions, but the point at which a lookup table was provided differed. Participants in
the pre-training condition memorized the table before practice began, those in the intraining condition were given the table after completing half of the training trials, and
those in the post-training condition received the table after training was completed. A
no-table training condition completed the full practice phase, but did not memorize the
lookup table. In addition, four control conditions were run. The standard test control
took the standard test with no prior experience. The standard test table-control
memorized a lookup table calibrated for the goal output of 6000 and took only the
standard test. The new goal control condition took only the new goal test.
This procedure allowed for testing several hypotheses. The first hypothesis is
that the point of introduction of model-based knowledge will affect the amount of
experiential knowledge acquired. Lane, et al. (2007) demonstrated the facilitative
effects of providing model based knowledge on task performance. Experiential practice
before model-based knowledge may increase the amount of experiential knowledge
acquired, thus combining the precision of model-based knowledge and the flexibility of
experiential knowledge. If providing model based knowledge limits participants’
exploration of the problem space, participants may not experience a wide enough range
of instances which may limit the amount of experiential knowledge acquired. If this is
the case, participants who memorize the table before practice should perform as well as
participants who memorize the table during and after practice on the Standard test, but
may show worse performance than those two conditions when the goal is changed and
on “new” states in the extended range test. This pattern of results would suggest that
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providing model-based knowledge before practice limits the amount of experiential
knowledge participants acquired. However, it is also possible that providing modelbased knowledge after practice may be sub-optimal. In this case, participants may not
have an opportunity to integrate the lookup table with their experiential knowledge, or
memorizing the lookup table may interfere with the deployment of experiential
knowledge.
Providing model-based knowledge before practice may limit the acquisition of
experiential knowledge while providing it after practice may interfere with the
deployment of experiential knowledge. It is possible that providing model-based
knowledge half-way through practice will allow participants to both acquire experiential
knowledge and then integrate the provided model-based knowledge into their
representation of the task. If this prediction is correct, the data will show superior
performance in participants who memorize the table during training across the standard,
new goal, speeded, and extended range tests compared to participants in the pretraining and post-training conditions.
Method
Participants. A total of 265 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology courses at Louisiana State University were recruited to voluntarily
participate in return for extra credit. These participants were randomly assigned to one
of seven conditions. There were four training conditions: Pre-Training (N = 37), InTraining (N = 40), Post-Training (N = 37), and No-Table Training (N = 37). In addition,
there were also three control groups: standard test Control (N = 37), standard test
Table-Control (N = 38), new goal Control (N = 39).
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Task. The same reactor control task used in Experiment 1 was used in
Experiment 2.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups up to eight. Participants in the
training conditions completed 280 blocks of six trials in which the goal was to maintain a
goal output of 6000 degrees. Participants in the Pre-Training condition memorized a full
lookup table before training, those in the In-Training condition memorized the lookup
table after completing 140 blocks, and those in the Post-Training condition memorized
the table after completing all 280 blocks. Participants in all table conditions were given
a set of 12 index cards, with an output level on one side of the card, and the correct
input on the reverse. Participants were instructed to learn the correct input for each
output level and told that they would complete a quiz before being allowed to proceed.
After reviewing the cards, participants were given a fill-in-the-blank paper quiz with 12
questions, one for each output level (i.e. If the temperature is 1000 degrees, how many
fuel pellets should you input?). Participants in the No-Table Training condition
completed 280 trials but did not memorize the table.
After completing the training phase, participants took a 30-block standard test.
This test is similar to the training task in that participants were required to maintain a
goal output of 6000 degrees. Participants then took a 30-block speeded test in which
the goal is 6000 and response time was limited to 1100 ms. This response time was
chosen based on a pilot test which included the author who has extensive experience
with the task. During pilot testing, the response time was increasingly lowered until
testers found it difficult to maintain the target output. If participants did not respond
within the time limit, the computer entered a random input. Following the speeded test,
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participants took the extended range test. Like in Experiment 1, the output range was
extended from -3000 to 16000 degrees and participants placed a wager before
receiving feedback. The extended range test was followed by a 30-block new goal test
where the goal was 8000 degrees. Finally, participants complete a table test similar to
that in Experiment 1.
Participants in the standard test control took only the standard test with no prior
experience with the task. Those in the standard test table-control memorized the table
before taking the standard test. Participants in the new goal control took the new goal
test with no prior experience with the task.
Results
After practice, participants first the standard test with the goal state set at 6000,
the same as in practice. The analysis run on the data from this test compared
performance of participants who learned the table and practiced, participants who only
practiced, participants who learned the table but did not practice, and participants who
did not learn the table or practice the task. The purpose of this analysis was to
demonstrate that practice alone is better than no practice, but that table knowledge
alone is comparable to table knowledge and practice on the standard test.
The next analysis reported is the from the new goal test. Like in Experiment 1,
the new goal test measured participants’ ability to transfer their knowledge from the goal
of 6000 to 8000. In addition to comparing performance across goals, a difference score
was calculated by subtracting performance on the standard test from that on the new
goal test. This allowed for a comparison of the decline in performance between learning
conditions to see which groups were most hindered by the change in goal.
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A similar analysis to that conducted on the new goal data was conducted on data
from the speeded test. This test allowed for a comparison of performance on the
standard test, and performance when time to respond is limited. A difference score was
calculated to compare the decline in performance across conditions.
As in Experiment 1 performance on the extended range test was compared
across old and new states as a measure of transfer. A knowledge score was also
calculated for each participant by dividing the number of advantageous wagers by the
total number of wagers.
Performance on the table test was measured in mean deviation from target. This
test was a measure of how well knowledge acquired in the graphical setting could be
applied to the same task in a text format. This along with the knowledge score was a
measure of how accessible task knowledge was.
Standard Test. As in Experiment 1, untransformed means for deviation are
reported (see Table 3) while analyses were performed on transformed data. A 2 x 2
ANOVA with exposure to practice (practice, no practice) and exposure to the lookup
table (lookup table, no lookup table) as factors was conducted (participants who learned
the table before, during, and after practice were collapsed into one group for this
analysis). There was a main effect of exposure to practice in which participants who
practiced the task before the standard test exhibited superior performance to those who
did not practice (M = 1882, 2249; F (1, 222) = 7.87, p< .05 ηp2 = .034). There was also
a main effect of the lookup table, such that participants who memorized the table
showed superior performance compared to those who did not memorize the table (M =
1154, 2934; F (1, 222) = 281.8, p< .001 ηp2 = .559). There was also an interaction (F

43

(1, 222) = 4.5, p< .05 ηp2 = .02). A follow up one-way ANOVA revealed that participants
who memorized the table and practiced (M = 1112) showed no significant performance
advantage over those who only memorized the table (M = 1280). Both of those
conditions displayed superior performance to that of participants who practiced but did
not memorize the lookup table (M = 2651), and all conditions were superior to
participants who did not practice or memorize the lookup table. These results show no
performance advantage of practice when participants have access to the lookup table.
However, when no lookup table is available, participants who practice show superior
performance to those who do not practice. This demonstrates that memorizing a lookup
table results in the best performance, but some knowledge is gained though experiential
practice as well.
Table 3. Mean deviation scores from Experiment 2.
Standard Extended
Extended
Speeded
Test
Range
Range
Test
Test-Old
Test-New
States
States
Pre941
1210
2578
2485
Training
(237)
(840)
(1973)
(748)
In-Training 1186
1285
2594
2461
(697)
(1161)
(2665)
(569)
Post1205
1552
2517
2876
Training
(665)
(1206)
(2018)
(533)
No-Table
2651
3917
6422
2870
Training
(696)
(1679)
(1565)
(259)
standard
3218
test
(502)
Control
standard
1280
test Table- (793)
Control
new goal
Control
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.
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New
Goal Test

2018
(518)
1696
(793)
1833
(942)
2951
(862)
-

3681
(469)

New Goal Test. A one-way ANOVA (including new goal control) analyzing
deviation scores on the new goal test was significant by group ( F (3, 183) = 28.4, p<
.001 ηp2 = .383). A Dunnett’s t-test compared all groups against the control and found a
significant performance advantage for all groups relative to the control. This analysis
demonstrates that even with training alone, participants can transfer knowledge to a
new goal.
A 4 x 2 ANOVA with condition (Pre-Training, In-Training, Post-Training, and NoTable Training) as a between-subject factor and test as a within-subject factor
(Standard test, new goal Test) was also run (see Figure 7). A main effect of condition
was found, with conditions that memorized the table performing better than those who
did not (F (3, 147) = 29.5, p< .001 ηp2 = .376). A main effect of test type was also
found, as participants performed better on the standard test compared to the new goal
Test (M = 1489, 2018; F (1, 147) = 135.7, p< .001 ηp2 = .48). An interaction was also
found (F (3, 147) = 20.0, p< .001 ηp2 = .29). A one-way ANOVA run on the difference
scores between new goal and standard test performance revealed that some groups
declined more than others (F (3, 147) = 19.9, p< .001 ηp2 = .29). While all conditions
performed poorly on the new goal test relative to the standard test, the No-Table
Training condition showed the smallest decline. Both the In-Training and Post-Training
conditions exhibited a larger decline across tests than the No-Table Training condition,
and the Pre-Training condition showed the largest decline of all (see Figure 8). A follow
up one-way ANOVA on the new goal test found a main effect of condition (F (3, 147) =
11.8, p< .001 ηp2 = .191). A Tukey post hoc test showed that participants in the PreTraining condition exhibited worse performance at the new goal than those in the In45

and Post-Training conditions. This suggests that the Pre-Training condition acquires
less knowledge which can be transferred than other conditions. One possible
explanation for this is that when participants have the lookup table before practice
began, they know the correct input for each output and spend little time exploring the
problem space. An analysis of the number of trials at each output state revealed that
participants in the Pre-Training condition spent 67% of trials in the practice phase at
5000, 6000, and 7000, significantly more than any other condition.
3500

Unsigned Deviation

3000
2500
Pre-Training

2000

In-Training
1500

Post-Training

1000

No-Table Training

500
0
Standard Test

New Goal

Figure 7. Performance on the standard test and the new goal test in Experiment 2.
Dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target.
Better performance on the new goal test by participants who memorized the
lookup table suggests that the lookup table along with some correction factor is used
when the goal changes. While those who do not memorize the lookup table show a
small decline when the goal is changed, their performance is still far worse than those in
the lookup table conditions. Thus, experiential knowledge is transferable across goals,
but experiential knowledge and a well-defined lookup table results in superior transfer
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performance. Clearly, providing the lookup table prior to a transfer test is necessary for
good transfer performance.

Unsigned Deviation

3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Pre-Training

In-Traininig

Post-Training

No-Table Training

Figure 8. Difference score between standard test and new goal test. Dependent
measure is the absolute deviation from target.
One important factor when providing model-based knowledge seems to be the
point at which it is introduced, as those who practiced the task before memorizing the
table showed a smaller decline across tests. It may be that experience with the task
before the introduction of model based knowledge allows greater exploration of the
problem space, which in turn results in the acquisition of more experiential knowledge.
Participants who memorized the table prior to practice were focused only on recalling
the correct input for each output and did not acquire the experiential knowledge
necessary for transfer to a new goal.
Speeded Test. Another 4 x 2 ANOVA with condition (Pre-Training, In-Training,
Post-Training, and No-Table Training) as a between-subject factor and test as a withinsubject factor (standard test, speeded test) was run (see Figure 9). A main effect of
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condition was found (F (3, 147) = 34.6, p< .001 ηp2 = .414) in which participants who did
not memorize the lookup table showed worse performance than those who did. There
was also a main effect of test type with performance on the standard test superior to
that on the speeded test (M = 1489, 2669; F (1, 147) = 349.6, p< .001 ηp2 = .704). A
significant interaction was found (F (3, 147) = 27.1, p< .001 ηp2 = .356). An analysis of
difference scores between the two tests show that all conditions but the No-Table
Training condition exhibited a significant decline in performance on the speeded test.
Additional post hoc analyses found no significant difference between the Post-Training
and No-Table Training conditions on the speeded test, suggesting that participants in
the Post-Training fell back on experiential knowledge rather than using the lookup table
when time to respond was limited (see Figure 10). This is in line with Anderson’s (1983)
idea that with extensive practice, declarative knowledge (lookup table), which is slow to
deploy, becomes proceduralized, or automatic. Those participants in the Post-Training
condition did not have extensive practice deploying the lookup table, and therefore were
unable to use it when time was limited.
Extended Range Test. Performance on the extended range test was analyzed
using a 2 x 2 mixed factorial ANOVA with training condition as the between-subject
factor and state type (old states, new states) as the within-subject factor (see figure 11).
A main effect of condition was found (F (3, 147) = 43.3, p< .001 ηp2 = .469) in which the
No-Table training condition performed worse than all other conditions. There was also
a main effect of state type, with a smaller deviation from goal on old states compared to
new states (M = 1977, 3509; F (1, 147) = 53.0, p< .001 ηp2 = .265). An interaction was
also found (F (3, 147) = 6.6, p< .001 ηp2 = .119). A follow up analysis using paired
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sample t-tests showed that all groups decline in performance from old states to new.
However, a one-way ANOVA on the difference between old and new states showed that
the decline in performance of No-Table Training condition was greater than that of all
other conditions. Furthermore, performance in this condition was at chance on new
states, suggesting random responding as in Experiment 1.
3500

Unsigned Deviation

3000
2500
Pre-Training

2000

In-Training
1500

Post-Training

1000

No-Table Training

500
0
Standard Test

Speeded Test

Figure 9. Performance on standard test and the speeded test in Experiment 2.
Dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target.

Unsigned Deviation
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0
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Post-Training

No-Table Training

Figure 10. Difference score between standard test and speeded test. Dependent
measure is the absolute deviation from target.
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The same 2 x 2 ANOVA was run on data from the wagers made during the
Extended range Test. A main effect of condition was found (F (3, 147) = 40.4, p< .001
ηp2 = .452) with No-Table Training winning significantly less than other conditions. An
effect of state type was also found with participants winning more money on old states
than new (M = 55.2, -3.7; F (1, 147) = 353.1, p< .001 ηp2 = .706). An interaction was
also observed (F (3, 147) = 16.6, p< .001 ηp2 = .253) such that the No-Table training
condition shows a smaller decline (greater losses) in winnings from old to new states
than all other conditions.
7000

Unsigned Deviation

6000
5000
Pre-Training

4000

In-Training
3000

Post-Training

2000

No-Table Training

1000
0
Old States

New States

Figure 11. Performance on old and new states from the extended range test in
Experiment 2. Dependent measure is the absolute deviation from target.
Like in Experiment 1, a knowledge score was calculated by dividing the number
of advantageous wagers (high when correct, low when incorrect) by the total number of
wagers. No significant differences between conditions were observed (F (3, 147) = .32,
ns) and all conditions were above chance. There was a difference in total amount
wagered (F (3, 147) = 8.4, p< .001 ηp2 = .147) such that the No-Table Training condition
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wagered less than all other conditions. When broken down between old and new
states, participants who memorized the table wagered more on old items than those in
the No-Table Training condition. On new states, there was no difference in amount
wagered. That the knowledge score data were above chance suggests that all
participants had some knowledge of how they were performing the task. While those
participants who memorized the table performed relatively well on new states, they did
not consistently place high wagers at those states. This switch from high wagers on old
states to low wagers on new states suggests that participants were not aware of how
they were performing the task at new states. It is possible that they simply recalled an
input for each old states, and used an extrapolation procedure for new states. This
extrapolation hypothesis is supported by reaction time data which show that participants
who memorize the table respond slower on new states. Recalling the correct input at
an old state is fast, while extrapolating the lookup table to account for a new state is
slow, and less accurate.
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that knowledge acquired from experiential
practice takes the form of a lookup table. Thus, it is interesting that participants who
memorize a lookup table can transfer their knowledge to new states, while those who
presumably develop their own lookup table cannot. One possible explanation for this
discrepancy is how the lookup table is organized. A self-generated lookup table may be
poorly organized with multiple inputs for each output. Providing participants with one
correct input for each output may have allowed them to see the “big picture”, or pattern
across the output-input pairs, making transfer to new states more likely. Participants
who developed their own lookup table through practice may not have organized their
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table in such a way that would have allowed them to see the pattern. Without
understanding the pattern, these participants were not able to extrapolate their table to
new states and instead respond randomly, as evidenced by their chance level
performance and significantly faster responses on new states.
Table Test. Performance on the table test was analyzed using a one-way
ANOVA, and an effect of condition was found (F (3, 147) = 11.7, p< .001 ηp2 = .192). A
Tukey post hoc test revealed no significant difference between conditions which learned
the lookup table, and significantly worse performance for the no-table training condition
relative to the other three conditions (see Figure 12). This analysis demonstrates that
while participants who learn the task through experiential practice have some access to
the knowledge they use to operate in the task, their access is limited compared to those
who learn the lookup table.

Unsigned Deviation
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Post-Training

No-Table Training

Figure 12. Performance on the table test in Experiment 2. Dependent measure is the
absolute deviation from target.
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Discussion
As expected, instruction type had an effect on flexibility of knowledge acquired.
Of course, providing a lookup table improved performance on the standard test, but also
on all other tests as well. The data from Experiment 2 suggest that participants who
memorized a lookup table gained experiential knowledge from practicing the task. This
resulted in significantly better transfer to a new goal than practice alone. Similarly, only
participants who memorized the lookup table were able to transfer to new states. The
level of experiential knowledge acquired seemed to have been affected by the point at
which the model-based knowledge was introduced. Providing the lookup table prior to
practice seemed to discourage exploration of the problem space, potentially limiting the
amount of experiential knowledge acquired, and impeding transfer to a new goal. In
addition, providing the lookup table after practice was also not optimal as experience
with the table is needed before it can be quickly deployed, as in the speeded test.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 examined the representation of experientially acquired knowledge
as a function of practice duration. On the Extended range test, both the long and short
training conditions exhibited better performance on old compared to new states.
Performance on new states was at chance and responses on new states were
significantly faster than old states. Taken together, these data suggest that participants
were recalling the correct input for a given output on old states, and selecting a random
input at new states. A strategy tuning model (Fum & Stocco 2003a, 2003b) would
predict similar performance across old and new states as a strategy which worked for
old states would be equally successful at new states. The data are more in line with a
lookup table model such as that proposed by Dienes and Fahey (1995, 1998), although
the chance performance on new states supports Cleermans’ (see Marescaux, Luc &
Karnas, 1989) idea that inputs at states not yet seen are chosen at random, not by
some explicit strategy. These results do not rule a more general lookup table model
(Lane et al., 2007).
Data from the new goal test show support the idea of a lookup table model
(specific or general) (Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1998; Lane et al., 2007). While
performance of the long training condition at the new goal test did not decline
significantly from performance at practice, participants were slower to respond when the
goal was changed. One explanation for the additional time needed to respond is that
participants applied a transformation to the lookup table (e.g. add 100 to the input for
any given output-input pair).
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Dienes and Fahey’s model (1995, 1998) suggests that the lookup table is implicit,
or inaccessible to learners. The data from both the extended range test wagering task
and the Table test are in conflict with this notion. Both the long and short training
conditions exhibited a pattern of advantageous wagering at an above chance level
suggesting at least some awareness of how the task was being performed. That
participants in the long training condition wagered more advantageously than those
whose training was short could mean that as training increasing, task knowledge
becomes more accessible. A similar pattern was seen on the Table test with both
groups performing above chance and the long training condition performing better than
the short training condition. When the context of the task was changed, participants
were still able to perform at an above chance level. This demonstrates some access to
knowledge of the task. That Table test performance did not correlate perfectly with
performance at practice is in line with Stanley et al.’s (1989) argument that the ability to
express knowledge gained through experiential practice lags behind actual task
performance.
While Experiment 1 demonstrated that at least with moderate levels of practice,
experientially acquired knowledge is represented as a lookup table, Experiment 2
sought to examine the best way to combine direct instruction using a lookup table and
experiential practice of the task. Lane et al. (2007) found that providing a lookup table
before practice resulted in very good performance on a standard test, but saw
performance decline on a transfer and a speeded test. The data from Experiment 2
replicated those results and expanded on them by showing that model-based
knowledge was necessary for transfer to new states. The results of Experiment 2
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demonstrate that providing model-based knowledge is necessary for a generalizable
representation. Without the direct instruction of model-based knowledge, transfer to a
new goal is poor and transfer to new states is at chance.
Also, the results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that memorizing the lookup table
at the mid-point of practice reduced the costs associated with model-based knowledge
seen in Lane et al. (2007). Participants who learned the table before practice
demonstrated relatively poor performance on the new goal test. An analysis of their
practice phase revealed that these participants spent the majority of the trials at three
states (5000, 6000, and 7000). This limited exploration of the problem space (Newell &
Simon, 1972) may have limited the amount of experiential knowledge acquired making it
more difficult to transfer their knowledge to the new goal. Those who learned the table
after practice performed no better than the No-Table training condition on the speeded
test. Thus it would seem that practice after direct instruction is needed if the learned
material needs to be deployed quickly, which is consistent with Anderson’s (1983) ACTR model in which declarative knowledge becomes procedural knowledge with practice.
The results of experiment have implications for pedagogy. Proponents of
instruction through experiential practice, or discovery learning as it is often called, cite
social constructivism literature (e.g. Vygotsky 1978), arguing that information is more
easily learned and transferred to new topics when the learner is an active participant in
the learning process (Bruner, 1961, Von Glasersfeld, 1989). Mayer (2004) challenged
the notion that pure discovery methods of instruction are superior to other types of
instruction. In his review of the literature, he consistently shows that guiding learners
(e.g. providing learners with information about the task) consistently produces superior
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results (e.g. learners remember more or produce fewer errors). One particularly
important claim of discovery learning proponents refuted by Mayer is that discovery
learning leads to superior transfer of knowledge to new situations (Kittle, 1957, Gagne &
Brown, 1961, Shulman & Keisler, 1966).
The results of Experiment 2 clearly demonstrate that direct instruction in addition
to experiential practice results in superior performance on the original task, transfer to a
new goal and new states, and when time to respond is limited. While direct instruction
at any point during training was far superior to experiential practice alone, the best
results were obtained when the direction instruction was scheduled for the mid-point of
the practice phase. This allowed for full exploration of the problem space as well as
sufficient practice deploying the model-based knowledge. This instructional model may
be best when the learner will be required to apply the knowledge in a wide variety of
situations and under time pressure. One example might be training for pilots who fly in
a variety of conditions and are often called on to make split-second decisions. The
advantage of combining model-based knowledge with experiential practice has been
demonstrated in the literature before (Mathews et al., 1989; Sallas et al., 2006). The
results of experiment 2 expand on this by demonstrating that the point at which the
model based knowledge is introduced has an effect on performance.
While these results may generalize to all types of learning, they are particularly
relevant to situations in which knowledge needs to be applied quickly and across a wide
range of situations. For example, pilots learn to fly in one type of airplane, but need to
transfer that knowledge across many planes. Additionally, they need to be able to use
their knowledge of landing procedures learned on their home airport, and apply it to
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landing strips which they have never seen before. Pilots must use their knowledge to
make mission critical decisions very quickly. The difference between mediocre and
good performance when time to respond is limited could be life and death. Training for
pilots and other professionals who are expected to deploy their knowledge quickly and
across a wide variety of situations would likely benefit from an instruction schedule
which includes direct instruction bookended by experiential practice.
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